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Abstract 
 
This paper constructs a two-country (Home and Foreign) general equilibrium model of 
Schumpeterian growth without scale effects. The scale effects property is removed by introducing two 
distinct specifications in the knowledge production function: the permanent effect on growth (PEG) 
specification, which allows policy effects on long-run growth; and the temporary effects on growth (TEG) 
specification, which generates semi-endogenous long-run economic growth. In the present model, the 
direction of the effect of the size of innovations on the pattern of trade and Home’s relative wage depends 
on the way in which the scale effects property is removed. Under the PEG specification, changes in the 
size of innovations increase Home’s comparative advantage and its relative wage, while under the TEG 
specification, an increase in the size of innovations increases Home’s relative wage but with an 
ambiguous effect on its comparative advantage. 
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1  Introduction 
Many models of endogenous growth and trade emphasize the role of continual product innovation based 
on R&D investment in determining the pattern of trade between countries. Grossman and Helpman 
(1991a, b, c) have developed models where innovations lead to either improvements in the quality of 
existing products (“quality ladders” models) or increase in the variety of the goods (“love for variety” 
models). Taylor (1993) has extended the continuum Ricardian model of Dornbusch et al. (1977) based on 
the “quality ladders” approach by Grossman and Helpman. All these studies exhibit the scale effect 
property: if one incorporates population growth in these models, then the size of the economy (scale) 
increases exponentially over time, R&D resources grow exponentially, and so does the long-run growth 
rate of per-capita real output.  
The scale effects property is a consequence of the assumption that the growth rate of knowledge 
is directly proportional to the level of resources devoted to R&D. Jones (1995a) has argued that the scale 
effects property of earlier endogenous growth models is inconsistent with post-war time series evidence 
from all major advanced countries that shows an exponential increase in R&D resources and a more-or-
less constant rate of per-capita GDP growth. Jones’s criticism has stimulated the development of a new 
class of models that generate growth without scale effects.1 However, the theoretical literature on trade 
and growth without scale effects has focused either on closed economy models or on structurally identical 
economies engaging in trade with each other.2 This paper develops a two-country general equilibrium 
framework without scale effects to determine the equilibrium relative wages and the pattern of trade 
between countries. 
 My approach borrows from Taylor’s work (1993) in that industries differ in research technologies 
and in the set of technological opportunities available for each industry. In the presence of heterogeneous 
research technologies (captured by different productivity in R&D services), the pattern of R&D 
production and the pattern of goods production within each country can differ. As a result, there is a case 
for trade between countries in R&D services.  
In the present model, there are two countries that may differ in relative size: Home and Foreign. 
The population in each country grows at a common positive and exogenously given rate and labor is the 
only factor of production. There is a continuum of industries producing final consumption goods. Labor 
in each industry can be allocated between the two economic activities, manufacturing of high-quality 
                                                 
1 See Dinopoulos and Thompson (1999) for more details on this issue. 
2 Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (2001) have recently developed a two-country general equilibrium model of 
endogenous Schumpeterian (R&D based) growth without scale effects to examine the effect of globalization on 
economic growth when countries differ in population size and relative factor endowments. 
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goods and R&D services, which are used to discover new products of higher quality. As in Grossman and 
Helpman ’s (1991c) version of the quality-ladders growth model, the quality of each final good can be 
improved through endogenous innovation. The arrival of innovations in each industry is governed by a 
memoryless Poisson process whose intensity depends positively on R&D investments and negatively on 
the rate of difficulty of conducting R&D. I consider two alternative specifications regarding the difficulty 
of conducting R&D in order to remove the scale effects property. The first specification is called the 
permanent effects of growth (PEG) and it has been proposed by Dinopoulos and Thompson (1996). 
According to this specification, R&D becomes more difficult over time and the degree of R&D difficulty 
is proportional to the size of the world market. The second specification is called the temporary effects of 
growth (TEG) and it has been proposed by Segerstrom (1998). With this specification, R&D also 
becomes more difficult over time but the degree of difficulty is an increasing function of cumulative R&D 
effort in each industry.  
Several comparative-steady-state results in Taylor’s (1993) model change with the removal of the 
scale effects property. First, in his model, the direction of the effect of the size of innovations (which can 
vary across industries) on the pattern of goods production, R&D production, the pattern of trade, and the 
relative wage depends on the assumption that the size of innovations is heterogeneous. Under the 
heterogeneity assumption, the increase in the inventive step creates a deficit in the balance of payments 
for Home because it raises the royalties’ payments that Home has to pay for using the front-line 
technology.3 Balance of payments is maintained through two adjustments; Home raises its goods trade 
balance by increasing the range of goods produced at Home and it reduces its reliance on imported R&D 
by conducting more itself. Removing part of this heterogeneity in his model, by eliminating Home’s 
relative advantage in goods versus R&D, results in zero trade in R&D and no effect of the size of 
innovations on the pattern of trade and Home’s relative wage.4 On contrast, in the present model, the 
direction of the effect of the size of innovations on the pattern of trade and Home’s relative wage depends 
on the way in which the scale effects property is removed. Under the PEG specification, changes in the 
size of innovations increase Home’s comparative advantage and its relative wage, while under the TEG 
                                                 
3 Taylor (1993) divides the world’s available technologies into two sets: the set of front line technologies and the set 
of backward technologies. Frontline technologies are those that are minimum cost given the prevailing wage rate. 
He further assumes that when an innovator located in Foreign succeeds in the global R&D races and discovers the 
front line technology, it has two options: it can either implement this improvement on the foreign technology or it 
can go multinational and carry the innovation abroad to a wholly owned subsidiary. This subsidiary would then pay 
the foreign firm a royalty. 
4 Eliminating the across country heterogeneity in his model, results in factor price equalization and indeterminate 
pattern of trade in both goods and R&D. 
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specification, an increase in the size of innovations increases Home’s relative wage but with an 
ambiguous effect on its comparative advantage.  
The analysis in the present model generates new additional findings. Under both specifications, 
the model generates a unique steady-state equilibrium in which there is complete specialization in both 
goods and R&D production within each industry. Trade between the two countries occurs only in goods 
and not in R&D services. In contrast to the work of Grossman and Helpman (1991c), factor price 
equalization does not hold in the steady-state equilibrium under either specification (Propositions 1 and 
4). 
Under the PEG specification, Home’s relative wage depends positively on the Foreign’s relative 
size, the consumer’s subjective discount rate, and the population growth rate. It depends negatively on the 
R&D difficulty parameter, and the Home’s relative size, (Proposition 2). In contrast to previous models 
(Grossman and Helpman (1991c), and Taylor (1993)), these results highlight the effects of population 
growth and the R&D difficulty on relative wages. 
Under the PEG specification, the range of goods produced in Home and exported depends 
positively on the R&D difficulty parameter, Home’s relative size, and the size of innovations. It depends 
negatively on Foreign’s relative size, the consumer’s subjective discount rate, and the population growth 
rate (Proposition 3). These results also highlight the importance of population growth and the R&D 
difficulty parameter on the pattern of goods and R&D production, and the pattern of trade between the 
two countries.  
The remaining paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the features of the model. Section 
3 describes the steady state equilibrium of the model under the PEG specification and section 4 presents 
the comparative steady state results under the PEG specification. Section 5 analyzes the steady state 
equilibrium of the model under the TEG specification and section 6 presents the comparative steady state 
results under the TEG specification. Section 7 concludes this paper by summarizing the key findings and 
suggesting possible extensions. The algebraic details and proofs of propositions in this paper are relegated 
to Appendix A. 
 
2  The Model 
This section develops a two-country, dynamic, general-equilibrium model with the following features. 
Each country engages in two activities: the production of final consumption goods and research and 
development. Each of the two economies is populated by a continuum of industries indexed by ]1,0[∈θ . 
A single primary factor, labor, is used in both goods and R&D production for any industry. In each 
industry θ  firms are distinguished by the quality j of the products they produce. Higher values of j denote 
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higher quality and j is restricted to taking on integer values. At time 0=t , the state-of-the-art quality 
product in each industry is 0=j , that is, some firm in each industry knows how to produce a 0=j  
quality product and no firm knows how to produce any higher quality product. The firm that knows how 
to produce the state-of-the-art quality product in each industry is the global leader for that particular 
industry. At the same time, challengers in both countries engage in R&D to discover the next higher-
quality product that would replace the global leader in each industry. If the state-of-the-art quality in an 
industry is j, then the next winner of an R&D race becomes the sole global producer of a j+1 quality 
product. Thus, over time, products improve as innovations push each industry up its “quality ladder,” as 
in Grossman and Helpman (1991c). 
 I assume for simplicity, that all firms in the global economy know how to produce all products 
that are at least one step below the state-of-the-art quality product in each industry. This assumption, 
which is standard in most quality-ladders growth models, prevents the incumbent monopolist from 
engaging in further R&D, which is standard assumption in most quality-ladder models.  
 For clarity, I adopt the following conventions regarding notation. Henceforth, superscripts “h” 
and “f” identify functions and variables of “Home” and “Foreign” countries, respectively. Functions and 
variables without superscripts are related to the global economy, while functions and variables with 
subscripts are related to activities and firms within an industry. 
 
2.1  Household Behavior 
Let )(tN i  be country i’s population at time t. I assume that each country’ s population is growing at a 
common constant, exogenously given rate )()( tNtNg iiN &=  > 0. In each country there is a continuum 
of identical dynastic families that provide labor services in exchange for wages, and save by holding 
assets of firms engaged in R&D. Each individual member of a household is endowed with one unit of 
labor, which is inelastically supplied. I normalize the measure of families in each country at time 0 to 
equal unity. Thus, the population of workers at time t in country i is tgii NeNtN 0)( = . 
Each household in country i maximizes the discounted utility5 
∫ ∞ −ρ−= 0 )( )(log dttueU tg N ,               (1) 
                                                 
5 Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995 Ch.2) provide more details on this formulation of the household’s behavior within 
the context of the Ramsey model of growth. 
 6
where ρ  > 0 is the constant subjective discount rate. In order for U to be bounded, I assume that the 
effective discount rate is positive (i.e., Ng−ρ  > 0). Expression log u(t) captures the per capita utility at 
time t, which is defined as follows: 
∫ ∑≡ 10 )],,(log[)(log θθλ dtjqtu
j
j .                        (2) 
In equation (2), ),,( tjq θ  denotes the quantity consumed of a final product of quality j (i.e., the product 
that has experienced j quality improvements) in industry ]1,0[∈θ  at time t. Parameter λ > 1 measures the 
size of quality improvements (i.e., the size of innovations). 
At each point in time t, each household allocates its income to maximize (2) given the prevailing 
market prices. Solving this optimal control problem yields a unit elastic demand function for the product 
in each industry with the lowest quality-adjusted price 
),,(
)()(),,(
tjp
tNtctjq i
ii
i
θ=θ ,               (3) 
where )(tci  is country i’s per capita consumption expenditure, and ),,( tjpi θ  is the market price of the 
good considered in country i. Because goods within each industry adjusted for quality are by assumption 
identical, only the good with the lowest quality-adjusted price in each industry is consumed. The quantity 
demanded of all other goods is zero. The global demand for a particular product is given by aggregating 
equation (3) across the two countries to obtain  
∑
=
θ=θ
fhi
i tjqtjq
,
),,(),,( .               (4) 
Given this static demand behavior, the intertemporal maximization problem of country i’s 
representative household is equivalent to  
dttce itg
tc
N
i ∫ ∞ −ρ−0 )()( )(logmax ,               (5) 
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint iN
iiii agtctwtatrta −−+= )()()()()(& , where )(tai  
denotes the per capita financial assets in country i, )(twi  is the wage income of the representative 
household member in country i, and )(tri  is country i’s instantaneous rate of return at time t. The 
solution to this maximization problem obeys the well-known differential equation 
ρ−= )(
)(
)( tr
tc
tc i
i
i&
,                (6) 
Equation (6) implies that a constant per-capita consumption expenditure is optimal when the 
instantaneous interest rate in each country equals the consumer’s subjective discount rate ρ. 
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2.2  Product Markets 
In each country firms can hire labor to produce any final consumption good ]1,0[∈θ . Let ),( tLi θ  and 
),( tQi θ  respectively denote the amounts of labor devoted in manufacturing of final consumption good θ  
in country i and the output of final consumption good θ  in country i. Then the production function of the 
final consumption good θ  in country i is given by the following equation 
Q
i
i tLtQ α
θθ ),(),( = ,                (7) 
where Qα  is the unit labor requirement associated with the final consumption good θ . For simplicity, I 
assume that the unit labor requirement is equal to 1, which implies that one unit of labor is required to 
manufacture one unit of the good. I also assume that each vertically differentiated good must be 
manufactured in the country in which the most recent product improvement has taken place. That is, I rule 
out international licensing and multinational corporations.6  
The assumptions that goods within an industry are identical when adjusted for quality and Bertrand price 
competition in product markets imply that the monopolist in each industry engages in limit pricing. The 
assumption that the technology of all inferior quality products is public knowledge imply that the quality 
leader charges a single price, which is λ  times the lowest manufacturing cost between the two countries: 
{ }fh wwp ,minλ= .                   (8) 
I choose the wage of foreign labor, fw , as the numeraire of the model by setting: 
1≡fw .                               (9) 
I also assume that the wage of home labor, hw , which is also Home’s relative wage,ω , is greater than 
one7 
ω=hw  > 1.                (10) 
Assumption (10) implies that the price of every top quality good is equal to 
                                                 
6 Taylor (1993) incorporates multinational corporations in a model of endogenous growth and trade. In his model, 
innovations are always implemented on front line production technologies (i.e, that is technologies that are 
minimum cost given the prevailing wage rates) and when innovation and implementation occur at different 
countries, the resulting transactions are considered as imports and exports of R&D. 
 
7 In propositions 1 and 4, I provide sufficient conditions under which this assumption holds. 
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λ=p .                      (11) 
It follows that the stream of profits of the incumbent monopolist that produces the state-of-the-art quality 
product in Home will be equal to 
( ) )(),( tEqth ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −=−= λ
ωλωλθπ ,                               (12) 
while the stream of profits of the incumbent monopolist that produces the state-of-the-art quality product 
in Foreign will be equal to 
( ) )()1(1),( tEqtf λ
λλθπ −=−= ,                              (13) 
where )]()()()([)( tNtctNtctE ffhh +=  is the world expenditure on final consumption goods. 
 
2.3  R&D Races 
Labor is the only input engaged in R&D in any industry ]1,0[∈θ . Let ),( tLiR θ  and ),( tRi θ  respectively 
denote the amounts of labor devoted in R&D services in industry θ  in country i and the output of R&D 
services in industry θ  in country i. The production function of R&D services in industry θ  in country i 
exhibits constant returns and is given by the following equation8 
)(
),(),( θα
θθ i
R
i
Ri tLtR = ,                         (14) 
where )(θα iR  is the unit labor requirement in the production of R&D services. The presence of 
heterogeneous research technologies in the present model allows us to determine the pattern of R&D 
services first and then the pattern in the trade of manufacturing goods.9 
 The continuum of products [ ]1,0∈θ  is indexed by decreasing home relative unit labor 
requirement in R&D. If 12 θθ >  for any 1θ  and 2θ [ ]1,0∈ , then )(
)(
)(
)(
2
2
1
1
θα
θα
θα
θα
h
R
f
R
h
R
f
R >  should hold. 
                                                 
8 The empirical evidence on returns to scale of R&D expenditure is inconclusive. Segerstrom and Zolnierek (1999) 
among others developed a model where they allow for diminishing returns to R&D effort at the firm level and 
industry leaders have R&D cost advantages over follower firms. In their model, when there are diminishing returns 
to R&D and the government does not intervene both industry leaders and follower firms invest in R&D. 
9 Taylor (1993) has introduced heterogeneity in the research technologies and in the technological opportunity for 
improvements in technologies. The presence of heterogeneous research technologies makes trade in R&D services 
between countries possible.  
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Following Dornbusch et al. (1977), the continuous and decreasing relative unit labor requirement in R&D 
for each good θ  is defined as follows 
)(
)()( θα
θαθ h
R
f
RA =  and 0)( <′ θA .                 (A.1) 
 In each industry θ  there are global, sequential and stochastic R&D races that result in the 
discovery of higher-quality final products. A challenger firm k that is located in country }{ fhi ,∈  
targeting a quality leader in country }{ fhi ,∈  engages in R&D in industry θ  and discovers the next 
higher-quality product with instantaneous probability dttI ik ),(θ , where dt is an infinitesimal interval of 
time and 
)(
),(),(
tX
tRtI
i
ki
k
θ=θ ,              (15) 
where ),( tRik θ  denotes firm k’s R&D outlays and X(t) captures the difficulty of R&D in industry θ  at 
time t. I assume that the returns to R&D investments are independently distributed across challengers, 
countries, industries, and over time. Therefore, the industry-wide probability of innovation can be 
obtained from equation (14) by summing up the levels of R&D across all challengers in that country. That 
is, 
∑ θ=θ=θ
k
i
i
k
i
tX
tRtItI
)(
),(),(),( ,            (16) 
where ),( tRi θ  denotes total R&D services in industry θ  in country i. Variable Ii(θ, t) is the effective 
R&D.10 The arrival of innovations in each industry follows a memoryless Poisson process with intensity 
∑ θ=θ
i
i tXtRtI )(),(),( which equals the global rate of innovation in a typical industry. The function 
X(t) has been introduced in the endogenous growth literature after Jone’s (1995a) empirical criticism of 
R&D based growth models generating scale effects. 
                                                 
10 The variable ),( tI i θ is the intensity of the Poisson process that governs the arrivals of innovations in industry θ 
in country i. Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (2001) model the strategic interactions between a typical incumbent and its 
challengers as a differential game for Poisson jump processes and derive the equilibrium conditions that govern the 
solution to a typical R&D contest. They also provide an informal and intuitive derivation of these conditions. In the 
present model, I follow their informal derivation to derive my results.  
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A recent body of theoretical literature has developed models of Schumpeterian growth without 
scale effects.11 Two alternative specifications have offered possible solutions to the scale-effects property. 
The first specification proposed by Dinopoulos and Thompson (1996) removes the scale-effects property 
by assuming that the level of R&D difficulty is proportional to the market size measured by the level of 
population, 
X(t) = kN(t),               (17) 
where k > 0 is a parameter. 
This specification captures the notion that it is more difficult to introduce new products and 
replace old ones in a larger market. The model that results form this specification is called the permanent 
effects of growth (PEG) model because policies such as an R&D subsidy and tariffs can alter the per-
capita long-run growth rate.12 
The second specification proposed by Segerstrom (1998) removes the scale effects property by 
assuming that R&D becomes more difficult over time because “the most obvious ideas are discovered 
first.” The model that results from this specification is called the temporary effects of growth (TEG) 
model. In this model, the long-run growth rate is proportional to the exogenous rate of population growth 
and it is not affected by any standard policy instruments. Under the TEG specification, R&D starts being 
equally difficult in all industries ( 1)0,( =θX  for all θ ), and the level of R&D difficulty grows according 
to 
),()],(),([
)(
)( tItItI
tX
tX fh θμ=θ+θμ=& ,                       (18) 
where μ  > 0 is a constant. 
In subsequent sections I will consider each specification separately to analyze the steady-state 
equilibria and to derive their comparative-static properties. 
Consider now the stock-market valuation of temporary monopoly profits. Consumer savings are 
channeled to firms engaging in R&D through the stock market. The assumption of a continuum of 
industries allows consumers to diversify the industry-specific risk completely and earn the market interest 
rate. At each instant in time, each challenger issues a flow of securities that promise to pay the flow of 
                                                 
11 See Dinopoulos and Thompson (1999) for an overview of these models. 
 
12 Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998) provide micro foundations for this specification in the context of a model with 
horizontal and vertical product differentiation. 
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monopoly profits if the firm wins the R&D race and zero otherwise.13 Consider now the stock-market 
valuation of the incumbent firm in each industry. Let Vi(t) denote the expected global discounted profits 
of a successful innovator at time t in country i, when the global monopolist charges a price p for the state-
of-the-art quality product. Because each global quality leader is targeted by challengers from both 
countries who engage in R&D to discover the next higher-quality product, a shareholder faces a capital 
loss Vi(t) if further innovation occurs. The event that the next innovation will arrive occurs with 
instantaneous probability Idt, whereas the event that no innovation will arrive occurs with instantaneous 
probability 1-Idt. Over a time interval dt, the shareholder of an incumbent’s stock receives a dividend 
π(t)dt and the value of the incumbent appreciates by dttVdtttVtdV iii )(])([)( &=∂∂= . Perfect 
international capital mobility implies that rrr fh == . The absence of profitable arbitrage opportunities 
requires the expected rate of return on stock issued by a successful innovator to be equal to the riskless 
rate of return r; that is,  
rdtdttI
tV
tVdt
tV
tdtdttI
tV
tV
i
i
i
i
i
i
=θθ
−θ−θ
θπ+θ−θ
θ ),(
),(
]0),([
),(
),(]),(1[
),(
),(&
.    (19) 
Taking limits in equation (19) as 0→dt  and rearranging terms appropriately gives the following 
expression for the value of monopoly profits 
),(
),(),()(
),(),(
tV
tVtItr
ttV
i
i
i
i
θ
θ−θ+
θπ=θ & .        (20) 
A typical challenger k located in country i chooses the level of R&D investment ),( tRik θ  to 
maximize the expected discounted profits 
dttRwdt
tX
tRtV ikR
i
i
ki ),(
)(
),(),( θα−θθ ,        (21) 
where dttXtRdtI ik
i
k ])(),([ θ=  is the instantaneous probability of discovering the next higher-quality 
product and ),( tRw ikR
i θα  is the R&D cost of challenger k located in country i.  
Free entry into each R&D race drives the expected discounted profits of each challenger down to 
zero and yields the following zero profit condition: 
)()( tXwtV R
ii α= .           (22) 
                                                 
13 If the monopolist is located in Home, the monopoly profits are define by equation (12) and if the monopolist is 
located in Foreign the monopoly profits are defined by equation (13). 
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The pattern of R&D production across the two countries can be determined by utilizing equations (20) 
and (22). Evaluating these equations on the competitive margin in R&D production, θ~ , I can obtain the 
R&D schedule (i.e., the schedule of relative labor productivities in goods) as follows  
1)~(
)~()~( −+== θλ
θλθω
A
ARD ,                       (23) 
where )~(θRD is continuous and decreasing in θ~ . For low values of θ , Home has higher relative labor 
productivity than Foreign, and thus it earns higher wage. Therefore, Home has comparative advantage in 
producing and conducting R&D the final goods with lower θ  and Foreign has comparative advantage in 
producing and conducting R&D the final goods with higher θ . The R&D schedule can be depicted in 
Figure 1. 
Lemma 1. Under assumption (A.1) and for any value of the relative wage, λω < , there exists 
an industry θ
~
 defined by equation (23) such that 
(a)  )~(θω RD= schedule is downward sloping, i.e., )~(θDR ′ < 0, 
(b) firms are indifferent between conducting R&D in Foreign or in Home, 
(c) for each industry )~,0[ θθ ∈ , only Home conducts R&D, 
(d) for each industry ]1,~(θθ∈ , only Foreign conducts R&D. 
 Proof. See Appendix A. 
One can find the results from Lemma 1 in Dornbusch et al. (1977). However, the derivation of 
Lemma 1 differs between the present model and the one in Dornbusch et al. (1977). In their model, the 
results from Lemma 1 come from the assumption of perfect competition in all markets. In the present 
model, the intuition behind Lemma 1 results from the zero profit conditions regarding R&D. If in industry 
θ , R&D is undertaken by Home, then the zero profit conditions for R&D imply that Foreign has negative 
profits in this particular industry (see equations (20) and (22)). The larger the range that home exports, the 
lower the home’s comparative advantage in R&D. The decreasing mutual R&D condition suggests that 
Home firms have higher discount profits than foreign firms for the goods in the range )~,0[ θθ ∈ . Foreign 
challengers would not be able to finance their R&D costs in the range of industries )~,0[ θθ ∈  and choose 
not to engage in R&D since this would yield negative profits. The reverse is true for those industries that 
Foreign undertakes R&D. Home has negative profits in the industries ]1,~(θθ∈ , so it does not engage in 
R&D in those industries. Thus, both countries sustain their comparative advantage. 
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2.4  Labor Markets 
Consider first the Home labor market. All workers are employed by firms in either production or R&D 
activities. Taking into account that each industry leader charges the same price p and that consumers only 
buy goods from industry leaders in equilibrium, it follows from (7) that total employment of labor in 
production in Home is θθθ dtQh∫ ~0 ),( . Solving equation (14) for each industry leader’s R&D 
employment ),( tLhR θ  and then integrating across industries, total R&D employment by industry leaders 
in Home is θθαθθ dtR hRh )(),(
~
0∫ . Thus, the full employment of labor condition for Home at time t is 
given by 
∫∫ += θθ θθαθθθ ~0
~
0
)(),(),()( dtRdtQtN hR
hhh .             (24) 
I can derive in a similar way the full employment of labor condition for Foreign at time t and obtain 
∫∫ += 1~1~ )(),(),()( θθ θθαθθθ dtRdtQtN fRfff .             (25) 
Equations (24) and (25) complete the description of the model. 
 
3  Steady-State Equilibrium Under the PEG Specification 
In this section I derive the steady-state equilibrium under the PEG specification proposed by Dinopoulos 
and Thompson (1996), which is described according to equation (17).  
Assuming that the relative wage, ω , is constant over time at the steady-state equilibrium, 
equation (22) implies that N
ii gtXtXtVtV ==θθ )()(),(),( & . That is, the expected global discounted 
profits of a successful innovator at time t in country i, Vi(t), and the level of R&D difficulty, X(t), grow at 
the constant rate of population growth, Ng . In the steady-state equilibrium, the market interest rate, r, 
must be equal to the subjective discount rate, ρ .14 Combining equations (20) and (22) after taking into 
account equation (17), I obtain the following zero profit conditions for Home and Foreign respectively for 
each industry: 
)()(
)),((
)(
tkN
gtI
tE
h
R
N
θωαθρ
λ
ωλ
=−+
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −
,   )~,0[ θθ ∈∀         (26) 
                                                 
14 This property is shared by all Schumpeterian models where growth is generated by the introduction of final 
consumption (as opposed to intermediate production) goods. 
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)()1(
tkN
gtI
tE
f
R
N
θαθρ
λ
λ
=−+
−
,   ]1,~(θθ ∈∀ .        (27) 
Integrating equation (26) over )θ~,0[  and equation (27) over ]1,θ~( , I obtain the following zero 
profit conditions for home and foreign, respectively at the economy-wide level: 
( ) [ ])~()~()g-(X(t))(~ 21N θθρωλωλθ hh AAtE +=− ,          (28) 
[ ])~()~()()()()1)(~1( 21 θθρλλθ ffN AAgtXtE +−=−− ,          (29) 
where ∫= θ θθαθ
~
0
1 )()
~( dA hR
h , ∫θ θθαθ=θ
~
0
2 )(),()
~( dtIA hR
h , ∫= 1
~
1 )()
~(
θ
θθαθ dA fRf , and 
∫= 1
~
2 )(),()
~(
θ
θθαθθ dtIA fRf . 
Substituting equations (3), (9), and (10) into Home’s full employment of labor condition 
(equation 24) yields the resource condition 
)~()(
~)()( 2 θλ
θ hh AtXtEtN += ,             (30) 
Similar substitutions yield the resource condition for Foreign: 
)~()()()
~1()( 2 θλ
θ ff AtXtEtN +−= .            (31) 
The above resource conditions described by equations (30) and (31) hold at each instant in time 
because, by assumption, factor markets clear instantaneously in both countries.  
Equations (28), (29), (30), and (31) represent a system of four equations in four unknowns θ~ , 
ω , I, and E . Manipulating these four equations yields a second schedule in ( ),ωθ  space, the mutual 
resource schedule15 
)~1)](~()([
~)]~()([)~(
1
1
θθρ
θθρθω −−+
−+== h
N
h
f
N
f
AgkN
AgkNMR ,           (32) 
where )()()( tNtNtN hh =  is Home’s population relative to the world population and 
)()()( tNtNtN ff =  is Foreign’ s population relative to the world population. 
                                                 
15 In Appendix A, I derive the mutual resource schedule and show that it is upward-sloping in ),( ωθ  space. 
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The mutual resource schedule states that the relative wage, which clears labor markets in both 
countries, is an increasing function of the range of goods θ~  produced in Home. If the range of goods 
produced by Home increases, Home’s relative demand for labor (both ω in manufacturing and R&D) 
increases. The excess demand for labor drives the level of the relative wage higher. The mutual resource 
condition (MR) can be depicted in Figure 1. The vertical axis measures Home’s relative wage, ω , and the 
horizontal axis reflects the measure of industries, θ . The intersection of the downward sloping RD( θ~ ) 
schedule and the upward sloping MR( θ
~
) schedule at point E determines the steady-state equilibrium 
relative wage, *ω , and the marginal industry *~θ  in which both countries undertake production in goods 
and R&D services.16 
Therefore, I arrive at: 
Proposition 1. For sufficiently large 
[ ][ ])~()()( )
~()()(
)~(
)~(
1
1
1
1
θρ
θρ
θ
θ
h
N
h
f
N
f
h
f
AgktN
AgktN
A
A
−+
−+>′
′
, and if λω <  and 
for any ]1,0[∈θ , )()( θαθα hRfR > , then there exists a unique steady-state equilibrium such that 
(a) Home’s relative wage, *ω , is greater than one, 
(b) Home has a sustained comparative advantage in the range of industries )~,0[ *θθ ∈ . In each 
industry )~,0[ *θθ ∈ , only Home conducts R&D, produces, and exports the state of the-art 
product, 
(c) Foreign has a sustained comparative advantage in the range of industries ]1,~( *θθ ∈ . In each 
industry ]1,~( *θθ ∈ , only Foreign conducts R&D, produces, and exports the state of the-art 
product. 
 Proof. See Appendix A. 
The results from this proposition can be found in other models. The static continuum Ricardian 
model developed by Dornbusch et al. (1977) and the dynamic learning-by-doing model introduced by 
Krugman (1987) produce similar features with the equilibrium depicted in Figure 1. Proposition 1 
identifies the unique steady-state equilibrium level of Home’s relative wage and the marginal industry by 
utilizing the mutual R&D and resource conditions. The pattern of trade in goods is determined by 
comparative advantage across industries since no multinational firms and trade in R&D sector are 
                                                 
16 In appendix, I provide the sufficient condition for which the )~(θMR  schedule intersects the )~(θRD  schedule at 
a point above the 45º line, such as ω  > 1. 
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allowed17. In addition and in contrast to earlier work, the model predicts that the pattern of trade is 
determined by additional factors such as population growth and the R&D difficulty parameter. Finally, 
factor price equalization is not a property of the equilibrium depicted in Figure 1.  
 
4  Comparative Steady-State Analysis Under the PEG Specification 
In this section I examine the comparative static properties of the steady-state equilibrium presented in 
Figure 1. By totally differentiating the equilibrium conditions (23) and (35), one can obtain propositions 2 
and 318: 
Proposition 2. If )~()~()()( 11 θθ hfhf AAtNtN >   
and ( ) ( ) )~()~()~()()~()( 1111 θθθρθρ hfhNhfNf AAAgktNAgktN >−+−+ . Then under the 
PEG specification, Home’s relative wage, *ω , 
(b) (a) depends positively on Foreign’s relative size, )(tN f , the size of innovations, λ , the 
consumer’s subjective discount rate, ρ  and the population growth rate, Ng , 
(c) depends negatively on Home’s relative size, )(tN h , and the R&D difficulty parameter, k. 
 Proof. See Appendix A. 
The comparative steady-state properties of the PEG specification analysis are novel and differ 
from those in Taylor (1993). For example, in Taylor (1993), Home’s relative wage depends on Foreign’s 
relative size, Foreign’s unit labor requirement in manufacturing, and Home’s unit labor requirement. 
Proposition 2 identifies population growth and R&D difficulty parameter as important factors that affect 
the equilibrium relative wage. The comparative steady-state results from the PEG specification can be 
illustrated graphically. Figure 2 shows that an increase in Foreign’s relative size, )(tN f , shifts the MR 
schedule upward. At the initial relative wage equilibrium, *ω , the increase in )(tN f  would create an 
excess supply of labor abroad and an excess demand for labor at home. The increase in relative wage 
restores the equilibrium at point E′ . An increase in the population growth, Ng , operates through a 
decrease in the effective discount rate, Ng−ρ . It does not affect the RD schedule in Figure 2, but shifts 
the mutual resource schedule MR to the left, thus resulting in a higher relative wage, **ω . The increase in 
                                                 
17 Taylor (1993) developed a model a model where there is heterogeneity in research technologies and allowed for 
trade in R&D services as well. 
18 The results presented in this section are derived algebraically in Appendix A. 
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the population growth rate, Ng , increases the value of the expected discounted profits of a successful 
innovator in both countries. At the same time, both countries become more innovative (the global R&D 
investment, ),( tI θ , has to increase to maintain the equality in equation (27)). For a given increase in the 
global R&D investment, the relative wage has to increase in order to restore the equilibrium condition in 
equation (26).  
An increase on Home’s relative size, )(tN h , in the R&D difficulty parameter, k, or in the 
consumer’s subjective discount rate, ρ , each shifts the MR schedule downward and decreases the 
relative wage (see Figure 3).  
Finally, an increase in the size of innovations shifts the RD schedule upward and thus it raises 
Home’s relative wages. The upward shift of the RD curve can be seen from the RD condition (equation 
23), which can be rewritten as 
)~(
)~(
1 *
**
θα
θωα
λ
ωλ
f
R
h
R=−
−
. From this last expression it is obvious that as the 
size of innovations increases, Home’s relative profit from manufacturing (the left-hand side) increases, 
while its relative R&D labor cost (the right-hand side) remains the same. At the marginal industry *
~θ , 
Home firms have (compared to Foreign firms) higher profits from manufacturing than before. As a result, 
the relative wage should increase to offset the increase the labor cost. These results can be seen in Figure 
4. 
Proposition 3. Assume that )~()~()()( 11 θθ hfhf AAtNtN >  and 
( ) ( ) )~()~()~()()~()( 1111 θθθρθρ hfhNhfNf AAAgktNAgktN >−+−+ . Then under the PEG 
specification, the range of goods Home produces, conducts R&D, and exports, *
~θ , 
(a) depends positively on Home’s relative size, )(tN h , the R&D difficulty parameter, k, and on the 
size of innovations, λ . 
(b) depends negatively on Foreign’s relative size, )(tN f , the consumer’s subjective discount rate, 
ρ , and the population growth rate, Ng . 
 Proof. See Appendix A. 
These comparative steady-state properties can also be illustrated graphically by utilizing Figures 
2 through 4. In Figure 2 an increase in Foreign’s relative size, )(tN f , shifts the MR schedule upward and 
reduces Home’s comparative and absolute (if any) advantage in both goods and R&D production. In 
contrast to previous work, the pattern of goods and R&D production as well as the pattern of trade are 
also determined by population growth and the R&D difficulty parameter. An increase in the population 
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growth rate, Ng , shifts the MR schedule upward in Figure 2, and increases the relative wage. As a result, 
it reduces Home’s comparative and absolute (if any) advantage in both goods and R&D production. An 
increase in the R&D difficulty parameter, k, or a decrease in the consumer’s subjective discount rate, ρ , 
each shifts the MR schedule downward and increase Home’s comparative and absolute (if any) advantage 
in both goods and R&D production (see Figure 3). 
Finally, an increase in the size of innovations shifts the RD schedule upward and thus it raises 
Home’s comparative advantage. The upward shift of the RD curve can be seen from the RD condition 
(equation 23). As the size of innovations increases it becomes more profitable for Home firms to engage 
in R&D and thus produce and export more goods. These results can be seen in Figure 4. 
 
5  Steady-State Equilibrium Under the TEG Specification 
In this section I derive the steady-state equilibrium under the TEG specification proposed by Segerstrom 
(1998), which is described according to equation (18). 
It is easy to show that under the TEG specification, equation (23) still holds.19 
Combining equations (20) and (22), I obtain the following zero profit conditions for Home and 
Foreign respectively: 
)()(
)),((
)(
tX
gtI
tE
h
R
N
θωαθρ
λ
ωλ
=−+
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −
,   )~,0[ θ∈θ∀ ,    (33) 
)()(
)),((
)()1(
tX
gtI
tE
f
R
N
θαθρ
λ
λ
=−+
−
,   ]1,~(θ∈θ∀ ,    (34) 
In a steady-state equilibrium all per capita variables are constant. Therefore, the level of R&D difficulty 
grows at the same rate of population growth, NgtNtNtXtX == )()()()( && . This last result, combined 
with equation (16) yields 
μ=
NgI  .           (35) 
Integrating equation (33) over )θ~,0[  and equation (34) over ]1,θ~(  (after taking into account equation 
(32)), I obtain the following zero profit conditions for Home and Foreign, respectively  
                                                 
19 In Appendix A, I provide the proof for the validation of equation (23) under the TEG specification. 
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( ) )~()(~)( 1 θωλ
θωλ hAtXStE =− ,        (36) 
)~()()()1( 1 θλ
λ fAtSXtE =− .         (37) 
where )( NN ggS −+= μρ . 
The full employment of labor conditions in Home and Foreign are given respectively by 
equations (30) and (31). 
Equations (30), (31), (36), and (37) represent a system of four equations in four unknowns θ~ , ω , 
X , and E . Manipulating these four equations yields a second schedule in ( ),ωθ  space, the mutual 
resource schedule20 
( ) .)]~()~([~)~()()]~(1)~()~1)[(~()(
~)~()~()()~(
121211
21
θθθθθλθθθ
θλθθθω hhffffhh
hff
SAAAtNASAAtN
AAtNMR −+−+−==  
This last equation is referred to as equation (38). 
The mutual resource schedule states that the relative wage ω , which clears labor markets in both 
countries, is an increasing function of the range of goods θ~  produced in Home. If the range of goods 
produced by Home increases, Home’s relative demand for labor (both in manufacturing and R&D) 
increases. The excess demand for labor drives the level of the relative wage higher. The mutual resource 
condition can be depicted in Figure 1. The intersection of the downward sloping RD(θ~ ) schedule and the 
upward sloping MR(θ~ ) schedule at point E determines the steady-state equilibrium relative wage, *ω , 
and the marginal industry *
~θ  in which both countries undertake production in goods and R&D services. 
Therefore, I arrive at: 
Proposition 4.  If )~(2 ′θfA <0, )~(2 θhA < )~(1 θhSA  , )~(2 ′θhA < )~(1 ′θhSA  and if λω <  and for any 
]1,0[∈θ , )()( θαθα hRfR > , then there exists a unique steady-state equilibrium such that 
(a) Home’s relative wage, *ω , is greater than one, 
(b) Home has a sustained comparative advantage in the range of industries )~,0[ *θθ ∈ . In each 
industry )~,0[ *θθ ∈ , only Home conducts R&D, produces, and exports the state of the-art 
product, 
                                                 
20 In Appendix A, it is shown how the mutual resource condition is derived and that it is upward-sloping in ),( ωθ  
space. 
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(c) Foreign has a sustained comparative advantage in the range of industries ]1,~( *θθ ∈ . In each 
industry ]1,~( *θθ ∈ , only Foreign conducts R&D, produces, and exports the state of the-art 
product. 
Proof. See Appendix A. 
As in the PEG specification analysis, the pattern of trade in goods is determined by comparative 
advantage across industries. Factor price equalization is also not a property of the equilibrium depicted in 
Figure 1. Finally, in contrast to the work of Taylor (1993), trade in R&D services does not occur. 
 
6  Comparative Steady-State Analysis Under the TEG Specification 
In this section I examine the comparative static properties of the steady-state equilibrium presented in 
Figure 1.  
By totally differentiating the equilibrium conditions (23) and (32) one can obtain propositions 6 
and 721: 
Proposition 5.  If )()( θαθα hRfR >  for all ]1,0[∈θ  and hf NN  > θθ ~)~1( − , then under the TEG 
specification, Home’s relative wage, *ω , depends 
(a) positively on Foreign’s relative size, )(tN f , the consumer’s subjective discount rate, ρ , the size 
of innovations, λ , 
(b) negatively on the Home’s relative size, )(tN h , the R&D difficulty growth parameter μ , and the 
population growth rate, Ng . 
  Proof. See Appendix A. 
These comparative steady-state properties can be illustrated graphically. Figure 2 shows that an 
increase in Foreign’s relative size, )(tN f , shifts the MR schedule upward. The increase in relative wages 
works as a mechanism to restore the equilibrium. These results are identical with those derived under the 
PEG specification. Under the TEG model, an increase in the population growth rate, Ng , shifts the MR 
schedule downward in Figure 3 and decreases the relative wage from *ω  to **ω . The increase in the 
population growth rate, Ng , has two effects on the value of the expected discounted profits of a 
successful innovator in both countries (see equations (33) and (34)). First, the increase in the population 
growth rate, Ng , has a positive direct effect on the discounted expected global profits. Second, it has a 
                                                 
21 The results presented in this section are derived algebraically in Appendix A. 
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negative indirect effect through the global innovation rate, I , (see equation (35). Thus, if the later 
negative effect dominates the positive direct effect, then the relative wage must decrease to restore the 
equilibrium. An increase in the consumer’s subjective discount rate, ρ , or an increase in the R&D 
difficulty growth parameter μ , shifts the MR schedule upward and increases the relative wage as seen in 
Figure 2.  
Finally, an increase in the size of innovations shifts upward both the RD schedule and the MR 
schedule. Thus, the increase in the size of innovation will raise Home’s relative wages. Similar to the 
PEG specification, the upward shift of the RD curve can be seen from the RD condition (equation 23). As 
the size of innovations increases, Home’s relative profit from manufacturing increases, while its relative 
R&D labor cost remains the same. At the marginal industry *
~θ , Home firms have (compared to Foreign 
firms) higher profits from manufacturing than before. As a result, the relative wage should increase to 
offset the increase the labor cost. On contrast to the PEG specification, the increase in the size of 
innovations will also affect the labor conditions, causing an upward shift in the MR condition. These 
results can be seen in Figure 5, where the increase in the size of innovations increases the equilibrium 
wage to **ω , while the effect on *~θ is ambiguous. 
Proposition 6. If )()( θαθα hRfR >  for all ]1,0[∈θ  and hf NN  > θθ ~)~1( − , then under the 
TEG specification the range of goods Home produces, conducts R&D, and exports, *
~θ , depends 
(a) positively on Home’s relative size, )(tN h , the R&D difficulty growth parameter μ , and the 
population growth rate, Ng ,  
(b) negatively on Foreign’s relative size, )(tN f , the consumer’s subjective discount rate, ρ . 
(c) ambiguously on the size of innovations, λ . 
Proof. See Appendix A. 
These comparative steady-state properties can also be illustrated graphically by utilizing Figures 
2 through 5 and are identical with those derived under the PEG specification. On contrast, an increase in 
the population growth rate, Ng , shifts the MR schedule downward in Figure 3, and decreases the relative 
wage. As a result, it increases Home’s comparative and absolute (if any) advantage in both goods and 
R&D production. An increase in the R&D difficulty parameter μ , or an increase in the consumer’s 
subjective discount rate, ρ , each shifts the MR schedule upward and decreases Home’s comparative and 
absolute (if any) advantage in both goods and R&D production (see Figure 2).  
Proposition 7. Under the TEG specification, the global R&D investment, I , depends positively 
on the R&D difficulty growth parameter, μ , and negatively on the population growth rate, Ng . 
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 Proof. If follows from equation (35). 
 The level of R&D investment, I, is completely determined by the exogenous rate of population 
growth Ng  > 0 and the R&D difficulty growth parameter μ  > 0. The balanced-growth innovation rate is 
higher when the population of consumers grows more rapidly or when R&D difficulty increases more 
slowly over time. These results are standard in the endogenous growth literature without scale effects. 22 
 
7  Conclusions 
The previous literature on “quality ladders” framework that analyzed Ricardian models of trade exhibits 
the scale effects property. In this paper, I have developed a model of trade based on “quality-ladders” 
growth without scale effects to analyze how the pattern of trade and the relative wage are determined in 
steady-state equilibrium. The model explores its comparative steady state properties of equilibria under 
two alternative specifications regarding the R&D difficulty, the PEG and the TEG specification. The 
absence of scale effects generates novel and interesting results. Several comparative-steady-state results 
in Taylor’s (1993) model change with the removal of the scale effects property. In the present model, the 
direction of the effect of the size of innovations on the pattern of trade and Home’s relative wage depend 
on the way in which the scale effects property is removed. The analysis in the present model generates 
new additional findings. Under both specifications, the model generates a unique steady-state equilibrium 
in which there is complete specialization in both goods and R&D production within each industry. In 
contrast to previous models (Grossman and Helpman (1991c), and Taylor (1993)), the comparative steady 
state exercises in the present model highlight the effects of population growth and the R&D difficulty on 
relative wages.  
Given the relatively simplicity of the model, this dynamic formulation provides a useful 
framework to examine other issues. For example, the introduction of trade instruments and their effect on 
the pattern of trade between countries can be examined under the two alternative models. Alternatively, a 
North-South model of trade might yield interesting implications. 
                                                 
22 See Segerstrom (1998) for more details on this. 
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Figure 1.  Steady-State Equilibrium Under the PEG and the TEG Specifications. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Comparative Steady-State Analysis Under the PEG and the TEG Specifications. 
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Figure 3.  Comparative Steady-State Analysis Under the PEG and the TEG Specifications. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Comparative Steady-State Analysis Under the PEG and the TEG Specifications. 
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Figure 5.  Comparative Steady-State Analysis Under the TEG Specification. 
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APPENDIX  
PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS 
(AVAILABLE UPON REQUEST BY THE AUTHOR) 
 
A.1  Proof of Lemma 1 
A.1.1  Lemma 1 
 Lemma 1 results from equations (20) and (22) (after taking into account equations (12) and (13)). 
Then, from the zero profit conditions, one can obtain the mutual R&D condition: 
1)~(
)~()~( −+== θλ
θλθω
A
ARD         (A.1) 
 
The slope of the mutual R&D condition is given by 
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If )~(θA >1, which implies that )~(θα fR > )~(θα hR , then λω dd . 
 
A.2  Proofs of Propositions 1, 2, and 3 Under the PEG Specification 
A.2.1  Proposition 1 
First, I derive the mutual resource schedule (equation (32)) for the PEG specification. I solve for 
)~(2 θhA of the right hand side in equation (28) and substitute it into equation (30) and then solve for E(t) 
and obtain the following: 
θ
ωθρ
~
)]~()()([)( 1
h
N
h AgXtNtE −+= .          (A.3) 
Then, from equation (29), I solve for )~(2 θfA  and substitute it into equation (31) and obtain the following: 
)~()(]~1)[()( 1 θρθ fNf AgXtEtN −−−=  .         (A.4) 
Substituting equation (A.3) into equation (A.4), I obtain the following mutual resource condition 
(equation (32) in the main text): 
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The sign of the slope of the mutual resource condition curve is found to be positive: 
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If )]~()([)~()]~()([)~( 1111 θρθθρθ hNhhhNhf AgkNAAgkNA −+′−−+′ >0, then θω ~dd >0. 
Therefore, the relative wage, ω , increases in θ~ .  
Thus, for sufficiently large
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, the MR schedule defined by 
equation (A.5) intersects the RD schedule such that a unique steady-state equilibrium exists and ω  > 1. 
The intersection of the downward sloping RD(θ~ ) schedule and the upward sloping MR(θ~ ) schedule at 
point E determines the equilibrium relative wage, ω , and the marginal industry θ~  in which both 
countries undertake production in goods and R&D services. 
 
First, I will prove equation (10) that is assumed in Proposition 1. A sufficient condition for home relative 
wage to be strictly greater than 1 is to have the mutual R&D curve lies above the 1=ω  line. This is true 
if 
)(
)()( θα
θαθ h
R
f
RA = >1 (that is if )(θα fR > )(θα hR ), then )()( θθω RD= >1. 
A.2.2  Proposition 2 
I can write the two equilibrium relationships governing Figure 1 in a more general form as 
follows: 
),~( λθω RD≡ ,  where RD1 < 0, RD2 > 0,                  (A.7) 
),,,,,~( N
hf gkNNMR ρθω≡ , where MR1 > 0, MR2 > 0, MR3 < 0,    (A.8) 
MR4 < 0, MR5 >0, MR6 >0. 
The following conditions have to hold in order to sign the above expressions: 
MR1 > 0 if and only if 
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MR4 < 0 and MR6 > 0 if and only if 
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I totally differentiate equations (23) and (32) in the main text and obtain the following system of 
two equations in the differentials of two endogenous variables as follows: 
λθω dRDdRDd 21 ~=−  
N
hf dgMRdMRdkMRNdMRNdMRdMRd 654321
~ ++++=− ρθω     (A.9) 
I can write the system (A.29) in the reduced form as follows: 
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⎦
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d
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1
1 ,   (A.10) 
I calculate the determinant of the matrix of the endogenous variables (which I denote with Δ ) as follows: 
11
1
1
1
1
MRRD
MR
RD −=−
−=Δ  < 0.        (A.11) 
Using the system of equations given by (A.10) and by employing the Cramer’s rule, I establish 
the comparative steady-state results for the PEG specification regardingω . I calculate the determinant of 
the matrix formed by replacing the second column of the matrix of the endogenous variables in (A.10) 
with the corresponding column vector of the exogenous variable in consideration. Thus, I obtain the 
following results: 
Δ
ω 21MRRD
Nd
d
f =  > 0,          (A.12) 
Δ
ω 31MRRD
Nd
d
h =  < 0,                      (A.13) 
Δ
ω 41MRRD
dk
d =  < 0,          (A.14) 
Δρ
ω 51MRRD
d
d =  >0,          (A.15) 
Δ
ω 61MRRD
dg
d
N
=  > 0,          (A.16) 
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Δλ
ω 12MRRD
d
d −=  > 0.          (A.17) 
The signs of equations (A.12) through (A.17) prove Proposition 2. 
A.2.3  Proposition 3 
Using the system of equations given by (A.10), I establish the comparative steady-state results for 
the PEG specification regarding θ~ . I calculate the determinant of the matrix formed by replacing the 
second column of the matrix of the endogenous variables in (A.10) with the corresponding column vector 
of the exogenous variable in consideration. Thus, I obtain the following results: 
Δ
θ 2~ MR
Nd
d
f =  < 0,          (A.18) 
Δ
θ 3~ MR
Nd
d
h =  > 0,           (A.19) 
Δ
θ 4~ MR
dk
d =  > 0,          (A.20) 
Δρ
θ 5~ MR
d
d =  <0,         (A.21) 
Δ
θ 6~ MR
dg
d
N
=  < 0,          (A.22) 
Δλ
θ 2~ RD
d
d −−=  > 0.          (A.23) 
The signs of equations (A.18) through (A.23) prove Proposition 3.  
 
A.3  Proofs of Propositions 4, 5, and 6 Under the TEG Specification 
A.3.1 Proposition 4 
The RD schedule under the TEG specification  is given by equation (23). 
Next, I derive the mutual resource schedule (equation (38)) under the TEG specification. 
First, I solve for X in equation (36), substitute it into equation (30), and solve for E(t) to obtain the 
following: 
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Then, from equation (37), I solve for X  and substitute it into equation (31) and obtain the following: 
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f
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tEASAtN −+−=  ,      (A.25) 
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where )g
μ
g
ρ(S N
N −+= . 
Substituting equation (A.24) into equation (A.25), I obtain the following mutual resource schedule 
(equation (38)): 
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For the following expression, I use D for the denominator of equation (A.26). 
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This last expression refers to equation (A.27). 
The following conditions have to hold in order to sign the above expressions: 
)~(2 ′θfA <0, )~(2 θhA < )~(1 θhSA  and )~(2 ′θhA < )~(1 ′θhSA . 
Under the above conditions, the mutual resource condition is upward sloping (i.e., θω ~dd >0). 
A.3.2  Proposition 5 
I can write the two equilibrium relationships governing Figure 1 in a more general form as 
follows: 
),~( λθω RD≡ ,  where RD1 < 0, RD2 > 0,                  (A.28) 
),,,,,,~( N
hf gNNMR ρλμθω≡ , where MR1 > 0, MR2 > 0, MR3 < 0,   (A.29) 
MR4 < 0, MR5 > 0, MR6 >0, MR7 >0. 
The following conditions have to hold in order to sign the above expressions: 
MR1 > 0 if and only if )
~(2 ′θfA <0, )~(2 θhA < )~(1 θhSA  and )~(2 ′θhA < )~(1 ′θhSA , 
MR7 < 0 if and only if θ
θ
~
)~1(
)(
)( −<
tN
tN
h
f
. 
I totally differentiate equations (23) and (32) in the main text and obtain the following system of 
two equations in the differentials of two endogenous variables as follows: 
λθω dRDdRDd 21 ~=−  
N
hf dgMRdMRdMRdMRNdMRNdMRdMRd 7654321
~ +++++=− ρλμθω  (A.30) 
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I can write the system (A.41) in the reduced form as follows: 
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I calculate the determinant of the matrix of the endogenous variables (which I denote with Δ ) as follows: 
11
1
1
1
1
MRRD
MR
RD −=−
−=Δ  < 0.       (A.32) 
Using the system of equations given by (A.31) and by employing the Cramer’s rule, I establish 
the comparative steady-state results for the PEG specification regardingω . I calculate the determinant of 
the matrix formed by replacing the second column of the matrix of the endogenous variables in (A.31) 
with the corresponding column vector of the exogenous variable in consideration. Thus, I obtain the 
following results: 
Δ
ω 21MRRD
Nd
d
f =  > 0,          (A.33) 
Δ
ω 31MRRD
Nd
d
h =  < 0,                      (A.34) 
Δμ
ω 41MRRD
d
d =  < 0,          (A.35) 
Δλ
ω 2151 RDMRMRRD
d
d −=  > 0,        (A.36) 
Δρ
ω 611MRRD
d
d =  > 0,           (A.37) 
Δ
ω 71MRRD
dg
d
N
=  < 0.          (A.38) 
The signs of equations (A.33) through (A.38) prove Proposition 5. 
A.2.3  Proposition 6 
Using the system of equations given by (A.31), I establish the comparative steady-state results for 
the PEG specification regarding θ~ . I calculate the determinant of the matrix formed by replacing the 
second column of the matrix of the endogenous variables in (A.31) with the corresponding column vector 
of the exogenous variable in consideration. Thus, I obtain the following results: 
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Δ
θ 2~ MR
Nd
d
f =  < 0 ,         (A.39) 
Δ
θ 3~ MR
Nd
d
h =  > 0,           (A.40) 
Δμ
θ 4~ MR
d
d =  > 0,          (A.41) 
Δλ
θ 25~ RDMR
d
d −=  >< 0?         (A.42) 
Δρ
θ 6~ MR
d
d =  < 0,          (A.43) 
Δ
θ 7~ MR
dg
d
N
−=  > 0.          (A.44) 
The signs of equations (A.39) through (A.44) prove Proposition 6.  
 
 
 
